

PROPOSED OUTLINE OF SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate

I. South Vietnam

- 1. The military situation:**
 - a. recent trends**
 - b. the present situation**
 - c. Communist plans and intentions**
 - d. prospects**
- 2. Communist order of battle and force effectiveness: methodology, data, and estimates**
- 3. The Communists' southern organization:**
 - a. its strength, effectiveness, attitudes and morale**
 - b. prospects in the anti-infrastructure campaign**
- 4. South Vietnamese political trends and prospects: the development of national institutions:**
 - a. the present state of affairs**
 - b. the election campaign: players and issues**
 - c. "peace sentiments" and the Buddhists' game**
 - d. attitudes toward the United States**
 - e. reconciliation and rapprochement with elements of the NLF**
 - f. general prospects**

5. South Vietnam's Economy: strengths, strains and prospects

6. Pacification:

- a. problems and concepts
- b. the security issue and ARVN's role
- c. our information base and knowledge gaps
- d. the present state of affairs
- e. the US role and impact
- f. trends and prospects

7. Summary assessment of the situation in South Vietnam

II. North Vietnam

8. Overall North Vietnamese attitudes towards the war:

- a. plans and intentions
- b. the Lao Dong's estimate of the situation and of our prospects
- c. North Vietnamese views on foreign (i. e. , Communist) assistance and support
- d. the issue of negotiations
- e. maximum and minimum North Vietnamese objectives

9. The impact of the bombing on North Vietnamese thinking

10. The cost imposed by the bombing and its impact on North Vietnam's economy

11. Summary assessment of North Vietnam's attitude

III. International Aspects

- 12. Chinese attitudes toward Vietnam**
- 13. Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam**
- 14. Communist propaganda and capabilities for influencing international opinion**
- 15. The international state of mind on Vietnam and its impact on the international position of the United States**

IV. Estimated Reactions to and Consequences of Possible US Courses of Action

- 16. To a 200,000-man increase in the size of US forces by the end of FY 1969**
- 17. To a continuation of the war on about the present scale, augmenting US forces by no more than a division or so**
- 18. To an intensification of the present bombing program which does not, however, seek to close ports or attack airfields not already struck**
- 19. To an intensification of bombing which does include effective interdiction of North Vietnamese harbors**
- 20. To various combinations of 16 - 19**
- 21. Probable consequences of restricting the bombing campaign to southern North Vietnam**